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Gender-based discrimination, harassment, and violence against women in the workplace and 
society generally have assumed new legal and political sigdicance as a consequence of recent 
high profile proceedings involving alleged misdeeds by elected government officials, members 
of the military, public school teachers and students, and the private corporate sector. This 
report reviews the judicial evolution of sexual harassment law, including a discussion of four 
recent US. Supreme Court rulings that dealt with the issue of same-sex harassment and 
determined the liability of employers and school districts for harassment by supervisory 
employees and acts directed against public school students. This report will be periodically 
updated. 
Sexual Harassment and Violence Against Women: 
Developments in Federal Law 
Summary 
Gender-based discrimination, harassment, and violence against women in the 
home, workplace, and society at large are continuing topics of legislative and judicial 
concern. Legal doctrines condemning the extortion of sexual favors as a condition 
of employment or job advancement, and other sexually offensive workplace behaviors 
resulting in a "hostile environment," have evolved from judicial decisions under Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and related federal laws. The earlier judicial focus 
on economic detriment or quid pro quo harassment-making submission to sexual 
demands a condition to job benefits-has largely given way to Title VII claims 
alleging harassment that creates an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment." 
In 1994, Congress broke new legal ground by creating a civil rights cause of action 
for victims of "crimes of violence motivated by gender." The new law also made it 
a federal offense to travel interstate with the intent to "injure, harass, or intimidate" 
a spouse, causing bodily harm to the spouse by a crime of violence. 
During its 1997-98 term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided four cases involving 
a range of issues from the legality of same-sex harassment to the vicarious liability of 
employers and a local school district for monetary damages as the result of 
harassment by supervisors and teachers. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services 
Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the federal circuit courts by 
ruling that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex harassment is actionable under 
Title VII.. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, held 
employers vicariously liable for sexual harassment of an employee by a supervisor 
with immediate or successively higher authority of that employee. Where the 
harassment results in a "tangible employment actionv-such as demotion or 
discharge-against the victim, Title VII liability is automatic and no defense is 
available to the employer. In cases not involving tangible reprisals or loss of job 
benefits, however, the failure of a complaining employee to take advantage of any 
anti-harassment policy and procedures made available by the employer may be 
asserted as an affirmative defense. Doe v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 
by contrast, ruled 5 to 4 that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 imposes 
no liability on local school districts for teacher harassment of students unless a school 
official with authority to institute corrective measures has actual knowledge of the 
alleged misconduct and is deliberately indifferent to it. 
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Sexual Harassment and Violence Against 
Women: Developments in Federal Law 
Introduction 
Gender-based discrimination, harassment, and violence against women in the 
home, workplace, and society at large have been the focus of considerable legislative 
and judicial attention in recent years. Legal doctrines condemning the extortion of 
sexual favors as a condition of employment or job advancement, and other sexually 
offensive workplace behaviors resulting in a "hostile environment," continue to evolve 
from judicial decisions under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other federal 
equal employment opportunity laws. In 1994, Congress broke new legal ground by 
creating a civil rights cause of action for victims of "crimes of violence motivated by 
gender." The new law also made it a federal offense to travel interstate with the 
intent to "injure, harass, or intimidate" a spouse, causing bodily harm to the spouse 
by a crime of violence.' On May 16,2000, however, the Supreme Court decided in 
U.S. v.   orris on' that Congress had overstepped its constitutional bounds when it 
passed the VAWA civil remedy provision and invalidated the statute. 
Sexual harassment issues have recently assumed new legal and political 
importance. The military conviction of a drill sergeant at the Army's Aberdeen 
training facility for rape and sexual harassment of female recruits, and recent 
allegations by the Army's highest ranking female general that she was harassed by a 
male colleague, have focused the public's attention once more upon sexual 
harassment in the military. Similarly, proceedings leading to the dismissal of sexual 
harassment charges against the President by a former Arkansas state employee 
spawned a host of legal and constitutional issues that may reverberate for years to 
come. Questions as to the legal responsibility of school districts or other educational 
authorities for sexual harassment within the schools are highlighted by judicial 
decisions and numerous alleged incidents of sexual abuse or unwanted displays of 
affection involving public school students and their teachers. 
During its 1997-98 term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided four cases involving 
a range of issues from the legality of same-sex harassment to the vicarious liability of 
employers and a local school district for monetary damages as the result of 
harassment by supervisors and teachers. On March 4,1998, the U.S. Supreme Court 
resolved a conflict among the federal circuit courts by ruling, in Oncale v. Sundowner 
' 18 U.S.C. 8 2261(a)(1). 
120 S.Ct. 1740 (2000). 
Ofshore Services Inc. ,3 that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex harassment is 
actionable under Title VII. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton4 and Burlington 
Industries v. Ellerth5 dramatically altered the standards that had been applied by 
federal appeals courts to determine employer liability in sexual harassment cases. 
Where harassment by a supervisor results in a "tangible employment action'-such 
as demotion or discharge-against an employee, Title VII liability is automatic and 
no defense is available to the employer. In cases not involving tangible reprisals or 
loss of job benefits, however, the fact that a complaining employee "unreasonably" 
failed to avail herself of any anti-harassment policy and procedures established by the 
employer may be asserted as an affirmative defense. Gebser v. Lago Vista 
~ndependent School Di~tr ic t ,~  by contrast, ruled 5 to 4 that Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 imposes no liability on local school districts for teacher 
harassment of students unless a school official with authority to institute corrective 
measures has actual knowledge of the alleged misconduct and is deliberately 
indifferent to it. Relying on Gebser, the Court in Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education7 recognized that school districts may also be liable for student-on-student 
harassment, but only where responsible officials "are deliberately indifferent to sexual 
harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the 
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school." 
Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Law 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not mention sexual harassment but 
makes it unlawful for employers with 15 or more employees to discriminate against 
any applicant or employee "because of. . .sex."8 Federal law on the subject is, 
therefore, largely a judicial creation, having evolved over nearly a three decade period 
from federal court decisions and guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) interpreting Title VIPs sex discrimination pr~hibition.~ Two 
forms of sexual harassment have been recognized by the courts and EEOC 
523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
524 U.S. 274 (1 998). 
' 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-2(a)(l). 
42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Sexual harassment in federally assisted education programs is also 
prohibited by Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, 20 U.S.C. 5 5 168 1 et seq. 
(Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public Schools, 503 US.  60 (1992)). While Title VII andTitle 
IX are the primary sources of federal sexual harassment law, relief from such conduct has 
also been sought, albeit less frequently, pursuant to $ 1983 of Title 42, the Federal Employees 
Liability Act, and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses ofthe US.  Constitution. E.g. 
Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, 975 F.2d 137 (5" Cir. 1992)(holding that a 
student has a firmly established equal protection and due process right to be free from sexual 
molestation by a state-employed school teacher). 
administrative guidelines. The first, or "quid pro quo" harassment, occurs when 
submission to "unwelcome" sexual advances, propositions, or other conduct of a 
sexual nature is made an express or implied condition of employment, or where it is 
used as the basis of employment decisions affecting job status or tangible employment 
benefits. As its name suggests, this form of harassment involves actual or potential 
economic loss--e.g. termination, transfer, or adverse performance ratings, etc.-- as 
a consequence of the employee's refbsal to exchange sexual favors demanded by a 
supervisor or employer for employment benefits. The second form of actionable 
harassment consists of unwelcome sexual conduct that is of such severity as to alter 
a condition of employment by creating an "intimidating, hostile or offensive working 
environment." The essence of a "hostile environment" claim is a "pattern or 
practice" of offensive behavior by the employer, a supervisor, co-workers, or non- 
employees so "severe or pervasive" as to interfere with the employee's job 
performance or create an abusive work environment. 
In 1980, the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title VII issued inter- 
pretative guidelines prohibiting both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual 
harassment. The EEOC guidelines focus on sexuality rather than gender-in terms 
of job detriments resulting from "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal or physical behavior of a sexual naturen-and require that a 
"totality of the circumstances" be considered to determine whether particular conduct 
constitutes sexual harassment.'' In addition, judicial developments in hostile 
environment law were anticipated by elimination of tangible economic loss as a factor 
and by providing that unwelcome sexual conduct violates Title VII whenever it "has 
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 
According to the EEOC guidelines, an employer is liable for both forms of sexual 
harassment when perpetrated by supervisors." The employer, however, is liable for 
harassment perpetrated by co-worker or nonemployees only if the employer knew or 
should have known of the harassment and failed to "take immediate and appropriate 
corrective action."I2 They also recommend that employers take preventive measures 
to eliminate sexual harassment3 and state that employers may be liable to those 
denied employment opportunities or benefits given to another employee because of 
submission to sexual advances.I4 
On March 19,1990, the EEOC issued "Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment" 
to elaborate on certain legal principles set forth in its interpretative guidelines from 
a decade before.15 First, the later document reasserts the basic distinction between 
"quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" and states that an employer "will always be 
held responsible for acts of 'quidpro quo' harassment" by a supervisor while hostile 
lo  29 C.F.R. !j1604.ll(a)(l995). 
" Id. at 5 1604.1 1(c). 
l2  Id, at !j 1604.1 1 (d)-(e) (1 995). 
l 3  Id. at 5 1604.1 1 (f). 
l4 Id. at !j 1604.1 1 (g). 
IS BNA, FEP Manual 405:6681 et seq. 
environment cases require "careful examination" of whether the harassing supervisor 
was acting in an 'agency capacity"'.I6 On the "welcomeness" issue, the policy guide 
states that "a contemporaneous complaint or protest" by the victim is an "important" 
but "not a necessary element of the claim." Instead, the Commission will look to all 
"objective evidence, rather than subjective, uncommunicated feelings" to "determine 
whether the victim's conduct is consistent, or inconsistent, with her assertion that the 
sexual conduct is un~elcorne."'~ In determining whether a work environment is 
hostile, several factors are emphasized: 
(1) whether the conduct was verbal or physical or both; (2) how frequently it was 
repeated; (3) whether the conduct was hostile or patently offensive; (4) whether the 
alleged harasser was a co-worker or supervisor; (5) whether others joined in 
perpetrating the harassment; and (6) whether the harassment was directed at more 
than one individual. 
However, because the alleged misconduct must "substantially interfere" with the 
victim's job performance, "sexual flirtation or innuendo, even vulgar language that is 
trivial or merely annoying, would probably not establish a hostile en~ironment.'"~ In 
addition, "the harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective standard of 
a 'reasonable person. "'lg
Quid Pro Quo Harassment 
The earliest judicial challenges involving tangible benefit or quid pro quo 
harassment claims-filed by women who were allegedly fired for resisting sexual 
advances by their supervisors-were largely unsuccessful. The discriminatory 
conduct in such cases was deemed to arise from "personal proclivity" of the 
supervisor rather than "company directed policy which deprived women of 
employment opportunities." Until the mid-1 9701s, federal district courts were 
reluctant either to find a Title VII cause of action or to impose liability on employers 
who were neither in complicity with, nor had actual knowledge of, quid pro quo 
harassment by their supervisory employees. An historic turning point came when the 
federal district court in Williams v. Saxbe20 held for the first time that sexual 
harassment was discriminatory treatment within the meaning of Title VII because "it 
created an artificial barrier to employment which was placed before one gender and 
not the other, despite the fact that both genders were similarly ~ituated."~' Echoing 
earlier opinions that an employer is not liable for "interpersonal disputes between 
employees," the court nonetheless rehsed to &miss the complaint since "if [the 
- - 
l6 Id. at 405:6695. 
l7 Id. at 405:6686. 
l 8  Id. 
lP Id. 
20 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). 
Id. at 657-58. 
alleged harassment] was a policy or practice of plaintiffs supervisor, then it was the 
agency's policy or practice, which is prohibited by Title ~ 1 1 . " ~ ~  
Appellate tribunals in several federal circuits soon began to affirm that quidpro 
quo harassment violates Title VII where "gender is a substantial factor in the 
discrimination," reversing contrary lower court holdings. For example, Judge 
Spotswood Robinson, writing for the D.C. Circuit in Barnes v. C ~ s t l e ~ ~  disagreed 
with "the notion that employment conditions summoning sexual relations are 
somehow exempted from the coverage ofTitle VII" as implied by the decision below. 
Finding that it was "enough that gender is a factor contributing to the discrimination 
in a substantial way," Judge Robinson ruled that differential treatment based upon an 
employee's rejection of her supervisor's sexual advances violated the statute. 
Similarly, in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., the Third Circuit reversed 
the trial court's denial of Title VII protection to all "sexual harassment and sexually 
motivated assault," finding that where an employee's "status as a female was a 
motivating factor in the supervisor's conditioning her continued employment on 
compliance with his sexual demands," actionable quid pro quo harassment had 
occurred. "[Tlo establish aprima facie case of quidpro quo harassment, a plaintiff 
mustpresent evidence that she was subject to unwelcome sexual conduct, and that her 
reaction to that conduct was then used as the basis for decisions affecting the 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of her empl~yrnent."~~ And while the 
loss of a "tangible employment benefit'' has most often meant dismissal or demotion, 
quidpro quo claims may also arise from denial of career advantages-job title, duties 
or assignments-f less immediate economic impact upon the employee. The Seventh 
Circuit, for example, has ruled that a tenured professor who was allegedly stripped 
of her job title and removed from academic committees because she rebuffed the 
sexual advances of the university provost may have a claim for quidpro quo sexual 
harassment under Title VII.2S 
The dismissal by Judge Susan Weber Wright of Paula Jones' sexual harassment 
lawsuit against President Clinton squarely addressed the workplace consequences that 
must flow from the refusal to submit to an unwelcome sexual advance for the court 
to find actionable hara~sment .~~ Plaintiff Jones claimed that her career advancement 
had repeatedly been thwarted by her state employer as retribution for rebuffing the 
former Arkansas Governor. As evidence of "tangible job detriments," Jones alleged 
that she had been discouraged by supervisors from seeking job promotions or pay 
increases; that following return from maternity leave, she was transferred to a new 
position with fewer responsibilities; that she was effectively denied access to 
grievance procedures available to other sexual harassment victims; and that by 
physically isolating her directly outside her supervisor's office with little work to do, 
22 Id. at 660-61. 
23 561 F.2d 983 @.C.Cir. 1977). 
24 Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773,777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 1 14 S.Ct. 2693 
(1 994). 
25 Bryson v. Chicago State University, 96 F.3d 912 (7" Cir. 1996). 
26 Jones v. Clinton, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (E.D.Ark. 1998). 
she was "subjected to hostile treatment having tangible effects." Judge Wright was 
unconvinced by the record, however, that any threat perceived by Jones during her 
alleged hotel meeting with the former Governor was so "clear and unambiguous" as 
to be a quid pro quo conditioning of "concrete job benefits or detriments on 
compliance with sexual demands." "Refusal" cases like Jones, calling for proof 
"tangible job detriment" by plaintiffs who resist unwelcome sexual demands, "27 were 
distinguished from so-called "submission'' cases, where "in the nature of things, 
economic harm will not be available to support the claim of the employee who 
submits to the supervisor's  demand^."^' 
It was widely anticipated that some further guidance on the essential character 
of quidpro quo harassment, particularly in relation to Jones' claims against President 
Clinton, would be forthcoming when the Supreme Court decided Burlington 
Industries, Inc, v. Ellerth.29 That case involved a former merchandising assistant at 
Burlington Industries who alleged that she was the subject of repeated boorish and 
offensive comments and gestures by a division vice-president who implied that her 
response to his advances would affect her career. Ellerth detailed three incidents in 
which her supervisor's comments could be construed as threats to deny her tangible 
job benefits. A short time later, she quit her job without informing anyone in authority 
about the harassment, even though she was aware of Burlington's anti-harassment 
policy. 
The trial court granted the company's motion to dismiss on the grounds that no 
adverse consequences flowed fiom the plaintiff's refusal to submit to the alleged 
advances. The action was reinstated by a per curiam decision of the entire Seventh 
Circuit holding the employer strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment "even if the 
supervisor's threat does not result in a company act"30 or actual economic loss. 
Appellate court rulings from the Eighth3' and E l e ~ e n t h ~ ~  Circuits, on the other hand, 
had during the same period reaffirmed the necessity of proving actual loss of job 
benefits or a "tangible job detriment" as an element of a quidpro quo claim. Squarely 
presented by Ellerth, therefore, was the question of whether sexual advances by a 
supervisor accompanied by the threatened but not actualized loss of employment or 
job benefits may render an employer liable for quidpro quo harassment. 
27 E.g., Cram v, L m o n  & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466 (8Ih Cir. 1995); Sanders v. Casa View 
Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 33 1,339 (Sh Cir. 1998)(noting that to withstand summary judgment 
on quid pro quo claims, plaintiffs were required to produce evidence showing that the 
harassment complained of affected tangible aspects of their compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995)("[A] 
supervisor's mere threat or promise of job-related harm or benefits in exchange for sexual 
favors does not constitute quid pro quo harassment. . . ."). 
Karibian v. Columbia Univ., supra n. 23. See also Jansen v. Packaging Corp of American, 
123 F.3d 490 (Th Cir. 1997). 
30 123 F.3d 490,494 (7th Cir. 1997)@er curiarn). 
3' Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1997). 
32 Farley v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co,, 115 F.3d 1548 (1 lth Cir. 1997). 
In fashioning an employer liability rule in Ellerth, and the Faragher case decided 
the same day, the Court considered the judicial distinction between quidpro quo and 
environmental harassment to be less important than whether the claim involved a threat 
that had been "carried out" in fact. Claims based on unhlfilled threats of retaliation 
were equated by the Court to hostile environment harassment, requiring plaintiff to 
prove "severe and pervasive" conduct. Under common law agency principles, as 
applied by the majority, an employer is generally immune from liability for the tortious 
conduct of its agent (the harassing supervisor in Ellerth), which is deemed to be 
"outside the scope of employment," unless the wrongdoer is "aided" in the harassment 
by "the existence of the agency relation." The "aided in the agency relation standard" 
differentiates supervisory harassment for which an employer may be automatically 
liable from similar acts committed by mere co-workers. And it is most clearly satisfied 
in those cases where the harassment culminates in a "tangible employment action." 
Such actions, according to Justice Kennedy, include instances where the subordinate 
employee is subjected to "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, 
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or 
a decision causing a significant change in benefits" for fiiling to permit sexual liberties. 
Since Ellerth had not demonstrated that she was the victim of retaliation by her 
supervisor - in fact, she had been promoted during the period in question - there was 
no tangible detriment for which the employer could be held strictly liable. 
Ellerth was remanded, however, for application of an alternative standard of 
vicarious employer liability formulated by the Court jointly in Ellerth and Farragher 
for supervisory harassment cases not involving a "tangible employment action." Under 
that rule, after the plaintiffproves that the supervisory misconduct is both "severe and 
pervasive," the employer may assert as an "affirmative defense" that its actions to 
prevent and remedy workplace harassment were "reasonable," while the plaintiff 
"unreasonably" failed to take advantage of any anti-harassment policies and 
procedures of the employer. Ellerth's failure to avail herself of the employer's 
grievance procedure likely defeats any Title VII recovery against Burlington under the 
second prong of this defense. The judicial task for lower courts after Ellerth is to 
construe this duty of reasonable care governing the employer's affirmative defense to 
liability. Other than rewarding employers for prophylactic measures aimed at 
workplace harassment and compelling victim participation in those efforts, Ellerth 
provides little specific guidance. Note also that Justice Kennedy's opinion for the 
majority in Ellerth included a passing elliptical reference to Jones v. Clinton when it 
"express[ed] no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to 
constitute discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment." This dictum 
largely begs the district court's conclusion that harassing circumstances alleged by 
Jones did not create a hostile environment, and since no "tangible employment action" 
was proven, any finding of actionable harassment under federal law was unwarranted. 
Hostile Environment Harassment 
The earlier judicial focus on economic detriment or quid pro quo 
harassment-making submission to sexual demands a condition to job benefits- 
largely gave way to Title VII claims for harassment that creates an "intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive environment." The first federal appellate court to jettison the 
tangible economic loss requirement and recognize a hostile environment claim of 
sexual harassment was the D.C. Circuit in Bundy v. J a c k ~ o n . ~ ~  The plaintiff there 
charged that several supervisors made continual sexual advances and propositions, 
questioned her about her sexual proclivities, ignored her complaints, criticized her 
work performance, and attempted to block her bid for promotion. The appeals court 
ruled that actionable sex discrimination is not limited to gender-based conditions 
resulting in a tangible job consequence, but occurs whenever sex is a motivating factor 
in treating an employee in an adverse manner. Despite the plaintiffs failure to prove 
quidpro quo harassment-she was not fired, demoted, or denied a promotion-the 
court was unwilling to adopt a rule that would permit an employer to lawfully harass 
an employee "by carefully stopping short of firing the employee or taking any other 
tangible actions against her in response to her re~is tance."~~ Another decision 
important to the judicial development of sexually hostile environment law was Henson 
v, Dundee where the Eleventh Circuit rejected a claim of quidpro quo harassment but 
found that the employee had a right to a trial on the merits to determine whether the 
misconduct alleged made her job environment hostile.35 
Meritor Savings Bankv. V i n s ~ n ~ ~  ratified the consensus then emerging among the 
federal circuits by recognizing a Title VII cause of action for sexual harassment. 
Writing for the Supreme Court in 1986, then-Justice Rehnquist affirmed that a "hostile 
environment," predicated on "purely psychological aspects of the workplace 
environment," could give rise to legal liability and that "tangible loss" of "an economic 
character" was not an essential element. This holding was qualified by the Court with 
important reservations drawn from earlier administrative and judicial precedent. First, 
"not all workplace conduct that can be described as 'harassment' affects a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment within the meaning of Title VII." For example, 
the "mere utterance" of an "epithet" engendering "offensive feelings in an employee" 
would not ordinarily be per se actionable, the opinion suggests. Rather, the 
misconduct "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the 
victim's] employment and create an abusive working en~ironment."~~ 
33 641 F.2d 934 (1981). 
34 Id. at 945. 
35 682 F.2d 897 (1 la Cir. 1982). In an oft-quoted passage from its opinion, the court stated: 
Sexual harassment whch creates a hostile or offensive environment for members 
of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that 
racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman 
run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work 
and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial 
epithets. A pattern of sexual harassment inflicted upon an employee because of 
her sex is a pattern of behavior that inflicts disparate treatment upon a member of 
one sex with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. There is 
no requirement that an employee subjected to such disparate treatment prove in 
addition that she suffered tangible job detriment. Id, at 902. 
36 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
37 Id. at 62 (quoting Henson v. Dundee), supra n. 21 at 904. In Vinson the complainant 
alleged that her supervisor demanded sexual relations over a three-year period, fondled her in 
(continued.. .) 
Second, while "voluntariness" in the sense of consent is not a defense to a sexual 
harassment charge, 
[tlhe gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances 
were 'unwelcome.' . . .The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct 
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual 
participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.38 
Accordingly, "it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or 
dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular 
sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously rele~ant."~' 
Finally, turning to the issue of employer liability, the Viason majority held that the 
court below had "erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable 
for sexual harassment by their  supervisor^."^^ The usual rule in Title VII cases is strict 
liability, and four Justices, concurring in the judgment, argued that the same rule 
should apply in the sexual harassment context as well. The majority disagreed, 
irnpliedly suggesting that in hostile environment cases no employer, at least none with 
a formal policy against harassment, should be made liable in the absence of actual or 
constructive kn~wledge.~'  
The Supreme Court's failure to clearly define what constitutes a hostile 
environment in Meritor Savings led to frequent conflict in the lower courts. For 
example, three federal Circuit Courts of Appeals-the Sixth, the Seventh, and the 
Eleventh-oncluded that in a sexual harassment case, a plaintiff must not only prove 
that the conduct complained of would have offended a reasonable victim and that he 
or she was actually offended, but also that the plaintiff suffered serious psychological 
" (...continued) 
front of other employees, followed her into the women's restroom and exposed himself to her, 
and forcibly raped her several times. She claimed she submitted for fear of jeopardizing her 
employment. During the period she received several promotions which, it was undisputed, 
were based on merit alone so that no exchange ofjob advancement for sexual favors (quid pro 
quo harassment) was alleged or found. 
38 Id. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. 5 1604.1 1 (a)(1985)). 
39 Id. at 69. 
40 Id. at 72. 
4 '  On the issue of employer liability, Meritor states: 
[While] declin[ing] the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer 
liability. . .we do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to 
agency principles for guidance in this area. While such common-law principles 
may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to 
define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of an employer, 42 U. S .C. 5 2000e(b), 
surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which 
employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. Id. at 72-73. 
injury as a result of the conduct.42 On the other hand, three other Circuits, the Third, 
the Eighth, and the Ninth, held that the Title VII plaintiff need demonstrate only that 
he or she was actually offended by conduct that would be deemed offensive by a 
reasonable victim.43 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, I ~ c . , ~ ~  revisited and offered some clarification of 
Meritor Savings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Harris to resolve the 
conflict among the circuits over whether harassing conduct must produce severe 
psychological harm to create an actionable hostile environment under Title VII. A 
company president had subjected a female manager to sexual innuendo, unwanted 
physical touching, and insults because of her gender. After two years, she left the job. 
Despite its determination that demeaning sexual comments by the employer had 
"offended the plaintiff, and would offend the reasonable woman," the trial court ruled 
against the plaintiff since the conduct alleged was not "so severe as to be expected to 
seriously affect plaintiffs psychological well-being" or create an "intimidating or 
abusive" environment. The Sixth Circuit upheld the trial court ruling in a three- 
paragraph unpublished opinion. 
The Supreme Court reversed, deciding in 1993 that hostile environment sexual 
harassment need not "seriously affect psychological well-being" of the victim before 
Title VII is violated. Meritor Savings, wrote Justice O'Connor, had adopted a "middle 
path" between condemning conduct that was "merely offensive" and requiring proof 
of "tangible psychological injury." Thus, a hostile environment is not created by the 
"'mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee."' 
On the other hand, a victim of sexual harassment need not experience a "nervous 
breakdown" for the law to come into play. "So long as the environment would 
reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for 
it also to be psychologically injurious." 
Harris also addressed the standard of reasonableness to be applied in judging 
sexual harassment claims, an issue dividing the lower federal courts then and now. 
Justice O'Connor opted for a two-part analysis, both components of which must be 
met for a violation to be found. First, the conduct must create an objectively hostile 
work environment-"an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile and 
abusive." Second, the victimmust subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive. 
The "totality of circumstances" surrounding the alleged harassment are to guide 
judicial inquiry, including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance; and 
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." 
Significantly, however, Harris did not explicitly resolve a fundamental issue raised by 
42 Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 6 1 1 (6" Cir. 1986); Scott v. Sears Roebuck, 
798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986); and Brooms v. Regal Tube, 830 F.2d 1554 (1 lth Cir. 1987). 
43 Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir 1990); Burns v. McGregor 
Electronic Industries, Inc., 955 F.2d 559 (8'h Cir. 1992); and Ellisonv. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 
( 9 ~  Cir. 1991). 
44 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
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several lower courts regarding the appropriate "gender perspective" to consider in 
assessing sexual harassment  claim^.^' 
An increasingly broad range of hostile environment harms-frequently as 
concerned with lewd comments, inquiries, jokes or displays of pornographic materials 
in the workplace as with overt sexual aggression-have been brought before the 
federal courts. Robinson v. Jackson Shipyards: I ~ c . ~ ~  was among the first reported 
decisions to impose liability for sexual harassment based on the pervasive presence of 
sexually oriented materials-magazine foldouts or other pictorial depictions-and 
"sexually demeaning remarks and jokes" by male co-workers without allegations of 
physical assaults or sexual propositions directed at the plaintiff. Most courts, however, 
have limited recovery to cases involving repeated sexual demands or other offensive 
c ~ n d u c t . ~ '  Except for cases involving touching or extreme verbal behavior, courts are 
often reluctant to find that sexual derision--or claims against pornography in the 
workplace-when unaccompanied by sexual demands, is suficient to create a hostile 
e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~  This tendency may be reinforced by the Court's admonition in Oncale 
45 Compare, e.g. Rabidue v. OsceolaRefining Co., 805 F.2d 61 1,622 (6" Cir. 1986)(holding 
that barrage of "nudie" pictures and litany of degrading comments were "annoying," but 
would not be sufficiently offensive to a reasonable person so as to interfere with the person's 
work performance), c a t .  denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) with Robinson v. Jacksonville 
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 199l)(applying reasonable woman 
standard to determine that pervasive pornographic pictures, sexual comments, verbal 
harassment, abusive graffiti, and unwelcome touching of some of plaintiffs female co- 
workers created a hostile working environment) and Spenser v. General Electric Co., 697 F. 
Supp. 204,218 (E.D. Va. 1988)(finding that sexual comments and suggestive behavior of 
plaintiffs superior, such as sitting on female workers' laps and talking about private parts, 
would have seriously affected the psychological well-being of reasonable female employee), 
aff'd, 894 F.2d 651 (4" Cir. 1990). See also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9" Cir. 
1991 )(adopting reasonable woman standard). 
46 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D.Fla. 1991). 
47 E.g. Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F. 2d 644 (6" Cir. 1986)fiolding 
that one instance of fondling and one verbal proposition were not sufficient to establish 
"hostile environment");E,g. Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 475 (Sth Cir. 
1989)("focus is whether [plaintiff] was subjected to recurring acts of discrimination, not 
whether a given individual harassed [plaintiff] recurrently."); King v. Board of Regents, 898 
F.2d 533, 537 (7" Cir. 1990)("although a single act can be enough, . .generally repeated 
incidents create a stronger claim of hostile environment, with the strength of the claim 
depending on the number of incidents and the intensity of each incident"). But cf. Vance v. 
SouthernTel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503,15 10 (11th Cir. 1989)C'the determination ofwhether 
the defendant's conduct is sufficiently 'severe or pervasive' to constitute racial harassment 
does not turn solely on the number of incidents alleged by plaintiff."). 
48 For example, inHallv. Gus Construction Co., 842 F.2d 1010,1017 (8" Cir. 1988), having 
found that defendants' conduct had gone "far beyond that which even the least sensitive of 
persons is expected to tolerate," the Eighth Circuit nonetheless felt compelled to add that 
"Title VII does not mandate an employment environment worthy of a Victorian salon. Nor 
do we expect that our holding today wdl displace all ribaldry on the roadway." See also 
Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 141 F.3d 751, 758 (7" Cir. 1998)(no hostile 
environment where offensive comments were "fairly sporadic . . . [and] unrelated incidents 
(continued.. .) 
that Congress never intended Title VII to become a general "code of civility." But 
conduct need not be overtly sexual; other hostile conduct directed against the victim 
because of the victim's sex is also pr~hibited.~' And, in line with Vinson, evidence of 
a sexual harassment claimant's own provocative behavior or prior workplace conduct 
is generally relevant to a judicial determination of whether the defendant's conduct 
was unwelcome.50 
48 (...continued) 
which occurred over two years of [plaintiffs] employment, were not physically threatening, 
most of the incidents were not severe, and only two of the incidents were directed at 
plaintiff'); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714 (5" Cir. 1986)(holding that two requests for 
sexual contact plus one incident of bare-breastedmermaids as table decorations for a company 
party were insufficiently pervasive to create hostile environment), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 
(1987). 
49 See Williams v. General Motors Corp., F.3d (6" Cir, 1999); Andrews v. City of 
Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 1469,1485 (3d Cir. 1990)("The Supreme Court [invinson] inno way 
limited this concept to intimidation or ridicule of an explicitly sexual nature ."); Bell v. Crackin 
Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (1 1" Cir. 1985)(holding that valid claim could be 
based on "threatening, bellicose, demeaning, hostile, or offensive conduct by a supervisor in 
the workplace because of the sex of the victim); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1140 
@.C.Cir. 1985)(district court erred in assuming that incident of physical force could not 
constitute sexual harassment unless "explicitly sexual"). 
See, e.g., Jones v. Wesco Investments Inc., 846 F.2d 115411.5 (8" Cir. 1988j("A court must 
consider any provocative speech or dress of the plaintiff in a sexual harassment case."); 
Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 556 (4" Cir. 1987)(affirming trial judge's 
determination to permit testimony that the plaintiff was "a foul-mouthed individual who o k n  
talked about sex," that the plaintiff had placed a "dildo in her supervisor's mailbox" and once 
grabbed the genitals of a male co-worker and sexually propositioned him). 
Claims involving isolated or intermittent incidents have frequently been dismissed 
as insufficiently pervasive." In Jones v. Clintons2, for example, Judge Wright ruled 
that considering the "totality of circumstances," an alleged hotel incident and other 
encounters between Paula Jones and former Governor Clinton were not "the h n d  of 
sustained and nontrivial conduct necessary for a claim of hostile work environment." 
In particular, the court noted that plaintiff Jones "never missed a day of work" because 
of the incident nor did she complain to her supervisors; never did she seek medical or 
psychological treatment as a consequence of alleged harassment; and that her 
allegations generally failed to demonstrate any adverse workplace effects. The Seventh 
Circuit, in another case, concluded that while an Illinois state employee "subjectively 
perceived her work environment to be hostile and abusive" the paucity of sexually 
oriented comments complained of-three suggestive comments by a co-worker over 
a three-month period-"were not sufficiently severe that a reasonable person would 
feel subjected to a hostile working en~ironment ."~~ Of course, a single incident may 
be actionable if it is linked to a granting or denial of an employment benefit (quidpro 
Scusa v. Nestle USA Company, 181 F.3d 958 (8" Cir. 1999)(pattern of co-worker 
harassment not actionable because it was not so severe or pervasive as to prevent plaintiff 
fkom performing all her duties on a full-time basis); Lam v. Curators of the Univ, of Mo., 122 
F.3d 654,656-57 (8" Cir. 1997)(noting that single exposure to offensive videotape was not 
severe or pervasive enough to create hostile environment); Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc, 
129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (7& Cir. 1997)(five sexually-oriented incidents spread out over the 
course of 16 months not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create hostile environment); Saxton 
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526,534 (7" Cir. 1993)("relatively limited" instances 
of unwanted sexual advances, which included the supervisor placing his hand on plaintiffs 
leg above the knee several times, rubbing his hand along her upper thigh; kissing her several 
seconds, and "lurching at her from behind some bushes," did not create an objectively hostile 
work environment); Chamberlinv. 101 Realty, 91 5 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1 99O)(five mild sexual 
advances by a supervisor, without more, were insufficient); Dnnkwater v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 904 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1990)(a claim must demonstrate a "continuous period of 
harassment and two comments do not create an atmosphere."); Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 
878 F.2d 338 (loth Cir. 1989)(use of foul language and infrequent touchlng of employees at 
24-hour restaurant was not pervasive or severe and management promptly took corrective 
action whenever complaints were made). 
'* Supra n. 25. 
53 McKensie v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 92 F.3d 473 (Th Cir. 1996). See also 
Butler v. Ysleta Independent School District, 161 F. 3d 263 (Sh Cir. 1998)(sexually offensive 
messages anonymously sent by elementary school principal to two female teachers not 
actionable since they were infrequent and non-threatening and were received at home while 
it is the "workplace itself [that] is central to the wrong of sexual harassment." Penry v. 
Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257 (loth Cir. 1998)(gender-based 
inappropriate behavior of supervisor over a three-year period- includmg needless touching, 
grabbing, and offensive comments-evinced "poor taste and lack of professionalism," but 
incidents "were too few and far between to be considered harassment). But cf., Abeita v. 
TransAmerica Mailings, 159 F.3d 246 (6" Cir. 1998)(though not directed at plaintiff, 
supervisor's sexually provocative statements to her about other women for an ongoing and 
continual basis for seven years, were sufficiently severe and pervasive to send case to the 
jury). 
quo hara~sment ) ,~  or if the incident involves physical assault5 or touching of the 
employee in an offensive manner under circumstances that preclude her escape.s6 The 
EEOC policy statement also states that the agency "will presume that the unwelcome, 
intentional touching of a charging party's intimate body areas is suMiciently offensive 
to alter the conditions of her working environment and constitute a violation of Title 
VII."57 
Same-Sex Harassment 
Title VII was interpreted early on by the courts and the EEOC to protect both 
men and women against workplace sexual harassment by the opposite sex. In Meritor, 
the Court found that Congress intended "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women" in employment and read Title VII to prohibit 
discriminatory harassment by a supervisor "because of the subordinate's sex." Until 
the Supreme Court decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., however, 
federal courts were sharply divided over whether the Act applied when the harasser 
and the victim are of the same sex. Although Title VII does not prohibit direct 
discrimination by an employer based on an employee's sexual orientations8-whether 
homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual-the EEOC5' and the District of C ~ l u m b i a , ~ ~  
54 Neville v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 857 F. Supp. 1461 (W.D.N.Y. 1987). 
" Crisoninov. New York City Housing Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)(supervisor 
called plaintiff a "dumb bitch" and "shoved her so hard that she fell backward and hit the 
floor, sustaining injuries from which she has yet to fully recover"). 
" Davis v. U.S. Postal Service, 142 F.3d 1334 (1 0" Cir. 1998)("[a] rational jury could frnd 
that a work environment in which a plaintiff is subjected to regular unwelcome hugging and 
kissing combined with other specific incidents . . . [including] an assault, is objectively 
hostile."). 
" BNA, FEP Manual at 405 :668 1. 
Ulanev. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7" Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 US.  1017 
(1985). 
'' The EEOC Compliance Manual states that the respective sexes of the harasser and the 
victim are irrelevant in determining whether Title VII has been violated: 
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the harasser. Since sexual 
harassment is a form of sex discrimination, the crucial inquiry is whether the 
harasser treats a member or members of one sex differently from members of the 
other sex. The victim and the harasser may be of the same sex where, for instance, 
the sexual harassment is based on the victim's sex (not on the victim's sexual 
preference) and the harasser does not treat the employees of the sex the same way. 
EEOC Compliance Manual, $ 6 15 .Z(b)(3). While EEOC interpretations of Title VII are not 
binding on the courts, they are frequently accorded judicial deference. See Meritor, 477 US.  
at 65. 
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,990 n. 55 @.C.Cir. 1977)(acknowledging the possibility 
of actionable Title VII claim where "a subordinate of either gender" is harassed "by a 
homosexual superior of the same gender."). 
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S i ~ t h , ~ '  Se~enth,~'  i g h t h , ~ ~  Ninth C i r ~ u i t , ~ ~  and Eleventh Circuitd5 all indicated that 
same-sex harassment was actionable in some circumstances. An apparent majority of 
federal district courts to consider the issue also allowed such claims where the alleged 
harassment is "because of' the victim's sex;66 the rationale being that Title VII bars 
disparate treatment based on the sex or gender of the employee, without regard to 
whether the harasser is male or female. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit concluded with 
minimal analysis that same sex harassment was never a~t ionable,~~ while other courts 
had limited Title VII liability to same sex cases based on homosexual conduct since 
only then was the harassment deemed to be "because of sex."68 
61 Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6" Cir. 1997)("It is not 
necessary for this court to decide today whether same-sex harassment can be actionable only 
when the harasser is homosexual; all that is necessary for us to observe is that when a male 
sexually propositions another male because of sexual attraction, there can be little question 
that the behavior is a form of harassment that occurs because the propositioned male is 
male--that is 'because of'. . .sex.") 
62 Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7" Cir. 1995)(In a heterosexual 
harassment action, the court noted parenthetically that "sexual harassment of women by men 
is the most common kind, but we do not mean to exclude the possibility that sexual 
harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or women by other women would not be 
actionable in appropriate cases."). See also J. Doe & H. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 
563 (7th Cir. 1997). 
63 Quick V. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8'h Cir. 1996)(evidence that male employees were 
the sole targets of other heterosexuals who practiced "bagging" co-worker testicles could lead 
to finding that such treatment was based on sex). 
64 Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9'h Cir. 1994)(commenting that 
"we do not rule out the possibility that both men and women. . .have viable claims against [a 
male supervisor] for sexual harassment"), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 733 (1995). 
65 Fredette v. BVP Management Associates, 112 F.3d 1503 ( l l &  Cir. 1997)rwhen 
homosexual male supervisor solicits sexual favors from a male subordinate and conditions 
work benefits or detriment on receiving such favors, the male subordinate can state a viable 
Title VII claim for gender discrimination"), 
66 See Gerd v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357 (D.Colo. 1996) and cases cited 
therein. 
67 Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F .3d 449 (5' Cir. 1 994) denied that "harassment 
by a male supervisor against a male subordinate [states] a claim under Title VII even though 
the harassment has sexual overtones" based on the earlier Fifth Circuit ruling in Goluszek v. 
Smith. The Goluszek court refused "a wooden application" of Title VII to salvage same-sex 
claims in favor of an interpretation that focused on "imbalance" and "abuse" of power in the 
workplace directed at "discrete and vulnerable groups." Title VII claims were limited, said the 
court, to the "exploitation of a powerful position to impose sexual demands or pressures on 
an unwilling but less powerful person." Since a male in a3'male dominated" work environment 
was not "inferiorw- or a victim of a "gender-biased atmosphere; an atmosphere of oppression 
by a 'dominant gender"'-same sex harassment was not actionable. See also Vandevanter 
v.WabashNat'1 Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D.Ind. 1994). 
McWilliams v. Board of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 11 91 (4" Cir. 1996). See also Wrightson v. 
Pizza Hut of America, Inc. 99 F.3d 138 (4'h Cir. 1996)("a claim may lie under Title VII for 
(continued.. .) 
On March 4,1998, the U.S. Supreme Court entered the fray and while providing 
a modicum of specific guidance, agreed with the majority view of the federal courts 
that "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of . . . 
sex' merely because the plaintiff and defendant (or the person charged with acting on 
behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex." OncaIe v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc. 69 involved quidpro quo and hostile environment claims of a male offshore oil rig 
worker who alleged that he was sexually assaulted and abused by his supervisor and 
two male co-workers for three months in 1991, forcing him to quit his job. Relying 
on the Fifth Circuit's earlier Garcia ruling, a federal judge in Louisiana dismissed the 
action. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit observed that Title VII's prohibition against sex 
discrimination is "gender-neutral" and seemed persuaded by Meritor and Harris that 
"so long as the plaintiff proves that harassment is because of the victim's sex, the sex 
of the harasser and victim is irrelevant." Nonetheless, the appeals court viewed itself 
bound by the panel decision in Garcia which could not be overruled absent a contrary 
en banc ruling by the Fifth Circuit or superceding decision by the Supreme Court. 
In a remarkably brief opinion, the Supreme Court revived Oncale's federal 
lawsuit, voting unanimously to defeat "a categorical rule excluding same-sex 
harassment claims from the coverage ofTitle VII." Long on implication, but short on 
detail, Justice Scalia's opinion for the court is notable for its emphasis on general 
sexual harassmentprinciples-transcending the limits of the same-sex issue before the 
Court-and possibly paving the way for stricter scrutiny of sexual harassment claims 
in general. First, the opinion observes that federal discrimination laws do not prohibit 
"all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace," only conduct that is 
discriminatory and based on sex. Moreover, harassing or offensive conduct "is not 
automatically discrimination because of sex, merely because the words used have a 
sexual content or connotation." Instead, Justice Scalia emphasized, those alleging 
harassment must prove that the conduct was not just offensive, but "actually 
constituted" discrimination. Secondly, reiterating Meritor and Harris, only conduct 
SO "severe or pervasive" and objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the 
victim's employment is actionable so that "courts and juries do not mistake ordinary 
socializing in the workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual 
flirtation-for discriminatory 'conditions of employment. "' Another modulating aspect 
of the Oncale ruling is the Court's obvious concern for "social contextyy and 
workplace realities when appraising all sexual harassment claims-same-sex or 
othenvise. 
The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation 
of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully 
captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. 
Common sense and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts 
and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members 
of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position 
would find severely hostile or abusive. 
(...continued) 
same-sex hostile work environment sexual harassment where, as here, the individual charged 
with the discrimination is homosexual"). 
69 118 S.Ct 998 (1998). 
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. The net effect of Oncale for same sex harassment and hostile environment cases 
generally is difficult to predict. The Court clearly reinjected the element of 
discrimination - 'because of sex" - back into harassment law, perhaps tempering a 
tendency on the part of some lower courts to equate offensive behavior with a hostile 
environment without more. Indeed, Justice Scalia goes so far as to state that ''Title VII 
does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment" and "requires neither asexuality or 
androgyny in the workplace." Because little guidance is offered, however, for 
determining when untoward conduct crosses the line to sex-based discrimination, 
formidable obstacles may remain for Joseph Oncale, the victor before the Supreme 
Court, and others like him. Justice Scalia's opinion suggests two possible approaches 
to demonstrating a nexus between sexually offensive conduct and gender 
discrimination. 
A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female 
victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as 
to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence 
of women in the workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, 
offer direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members 
of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. 
But it is difficult to discern how either approach would aid male sarne-sex plaintiffs 
like Oncale in proving discrimination "because of sex" when they are victims of 
harassment by other males on an oil rig or in other male-dominated workplaces. 
The Oncale ruling may also mark a general tempering of earlier decisions driving 
current trends in sexual harassment litigation. The numerous examples of "innocuous 
differences" in the way men and women interact cited by the Court might serve as the 
basis for hture judicial acceptance of a wider latitude of behavior in the workplace 
than might otherwise have been considered permissible. The lengths to which Justice 
Scalia seems to go in articulating the bounds of permissible heterosexual behavior in 
a same-sex harassment case reinforces this conclusion. Thus, the express approval of 
"intersexual flirtation" and "teasing or roughhousing" implies that a certain level of 
fraternization in the workplace is permissible and the consequent range of actionable 
conduct correspondingly reduced. In this regard, the decision's emphasis upon "social 
context" may complicate the already difficult judicial task of identifying a sexually 
hostile work environment. Does this mean, for example, that conduct permitted in a 
blue-collar workplace may be actionable in a white-collar, professional environment? 
Thus, the decision might lead to the dismissal of cases the courts have entertained in 
the past. At the very least, beyond its threshold endorsement of a same-sex cause of 
action under Title VII, the Oncale decision appears to raise as many questions as it 
answers. 
Remedies 
One major aspect ofthe 199 1 Civil Rights Act7' ofparticular importance to sexual 
harassment claimants was the extension ofjury trials and compensatory and punitive 
damages as remedies for Title VII violations. Previously, Title VII plaintiffs had no 
'O Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
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right to a jury trial and were entitled only to equitable relief in the form of injunctions 
against future employer misconduct, reinstatement, and limited backpay for any loss 
of income resulting from any discharge, denial of promotion, or other adverse 
employment decision. Consequently, victims of alleged sexual harassment were often 
compelled to rely on state fair employment practices laws,71 or traditional common law 
causes of action for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlawfbl 
interference with contract, invasion of privacy, and the like, to obtain complete 
monetary relief72 Section 102 of the 1991 altered the focus of federal EEO 
enforcement from reliance on judicial injunctions, where voluntary conciliation efforts 
fail, to jury trials, and compensatory and punitive damages, in Title VII actions 
involving intentional discrimination. 
Compensatory damages under the 1991 Act include "future pecuniary losses, 
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and 
other nonpecuniary losses."74 The compensatory and punitive damages provided by 
9102 are "in addition to any relief authorized by Section 706(g)" of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Therefore, plaintiffs may recover damages in addition to equitable relief, 
including backpay. Punitive damages may also be recovered against private employers 
where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the employer acted "with malice or reckless 
indifference" to the individual's federally protected rights. Punitive damages are not 
recoverable, however, against a governmental entity.76 In cases where aplaintiff seeks 
compensatory or punitive damages, any party may demand a jury trial.77 
The damages remedy under the Act is limited by dollar amount, however, 
according to the size of the defendant employer during the twenty or more calendar 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. The sum of compensatory and 
punitive damages awarded may not exceed: $50,000 in the case of an employer with 
more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees; $100,000 in the case of an employer 
with more than 100 and fewer 201 employees; $200,000 in the case of an employer 
with more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees; and $300,000 in the case of an 
employer with more than 500  employee^.^' In jury trial cases, the court may not 
inform the jury of the damage caps set forth in the statute. 
7 1  E.g., Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 448 N.W. 2d 526,51 FEP Cases 885 (Minn. Ct,App. 
1989), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 46 1 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. Sup.Ct. 
1990). 
72 See e.g. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal.3d 65, 901 P.2d 373 (Cal. Sup.Ct. 1990); Baker v. 
Weyerhauser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10" Cir. 1990); Syndex Corp. V. Dean, 820 S.W.2d 869 
(Tex. App. 1991). 
73 105 Stat. 1072,42 U.S.C. 8 1981a. 
74 42 U.S.C. 8 1981a(b)(3). 
75 Id. at 8 198 1 a(a)(l). 
76 Id. at 5 198 la(b)(l). 
77 Id, at 8 198 la(c). 
78 Id. at 5 198 la(b)(3). 
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A recent ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals significantly increases the 
amount of damages that may be awarded a former employee who proves harassment 
or other intentional discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
under Title VII, or disability under the Americans with Disability Act. The trial judge 
and jury in Gotthardt v. National Railroad7' awarded $350,000 in compensatory 
damages and $124,010.46 back pay for lost wages to a 59-year-old woman who was 
forced to quit her job due to posttraumatic stress syndrome caused by workplace 
harassment. Because she claimed that her age, stress, and background would foreclose 
a future job or career, the trial court also awarded the employee more than $600,000 
in "front pay" to cover wages lost from the date of jury verdict forward for eleven 
years. Amtrak argued that this front pay award must be included in the $300,000 
statutory cap on damages as "future pecuniary losses" specifically covered by the 
statute. Unfortunately for employers, however, the Ninth Circuit determined that front 
pay is an equitable remedy, rather than legal damages, and therefore not subject to the 
cap. There is currently a division in the federal circuits on this issue, but until the 
Supreme Court finally resolves the dispute, the stakes for employers may be 
considerable. The estimated monetary values of pending cases may be multiplied 
several times ifjuries or judges can be persuaded by plaintiffs' attorneys to award front 
pay for years, or even decades, into the future. 
The expansion of Title VII remedies dramatically affects the level of relief 
available in cases of intentional sex discrimination, where for the first time employees 
in the private sector have the prospect of federal compensatory and punitive damage 
recoveries and the right to a jury trial. The Act now provides a monetary remedy for 
victims of sexual harassment in employment in addition to lost wages. Since 
harassment of the hostile environment type often occurs without economic loss to the 
employee, in terms ofpay or otherwise, critics of the prior law charged that the sexual 
harassment victim was frequently without any effective federal relief Title VII 
plaintiffs may now seek monetary compensation for emotional pain and suffering, and 
other pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses, caused by sexual harassment. Moreover, 
federal claims may be joined with pendent state-law claims for damages unlimited by 
the caps in the federal law or an election made between pursuing state and federal 
remedies. 
Liability of Employers and Supervisors for Monetary 
Damages 
The addition of monetary damages to the arsenal of Title VII remedies rekindled 
inquiry into an employer's liability for harassment perpetrated by its supervisors and 
nonsupervisory employees, and of the personal liability of individual harassers. The 
Ellerth decision ratified the federal circuit courts, which had generally declared 
employers vicariously liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment committed by 
supervisorss0 culminating in tangible job detriment. Only those with actual authority 
- - 
" 191 F.3d 1148 (91h Cir. 1999). 
so See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1985)(noting that all circuits 
(continued.. .) 
to hire, promote, discharge or affect the terms and conditions of employment can 
engage in quid pro quo harassment and are held to act as agents of the employer, 
regardless of their motivations. Quidpro quo harassment is viewed no differently than 
other forms of discrimination prohibited by Title VII, for which employers have 
routinely been held vicariously liable. Because Title VII defines employer to include 
"any agenty' of the employer, the statute is understood to have incorporated the 
principle of respondeat superior, in effect holding "employers liable for the 
discriminatory [acts of] . . . supervisory employees whether or not the employer knew, 
should have known, or approved of the supervisor's  action^."^' However, the 
suggestion in Meritor Savings Bank that courts look to agency law in developing 
liability rules for hostile work environment led most lower federal courts to reject 
vicarious liability for employers lacking actual or constructive knowledge of 
environmental harassment perpetrated by a supervisor. 
Prior to Ellerth and Faragher, most courts made an employer liable for a hostile 
environment only if it knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to 
take prompt remedial action to end it. They reasoned that, unlike quidpro quo cases, 
in which a supervisor exerts actual authority to affect the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of a subordinate's employment, the supervisor is cloaked with no actual or 
apparent authority to create a hostile environment. In other words, the employer was 
directly liable for its own wrongdoing in not stopping harassment of which it was or 
should have been aware but was not automatically or "strictly" liable for supervisory 
rn i sc~nduct .~~  A minority view, however, recognized vicarious liability when the 
harasser was a supervisorg3 and created a hostile environment through threats and 
intimidati~n.~~ Similarly, an employer without actual or constructive knowledge was 
generally not liable for co-worker harassment since the discriminatory conduct was not 
within the scope of employment and the employer usually had conferred no authority, 
(. ..continued) 
reaching the issue have held employers strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment). 
" Meritor Savings, 477 US. at 70-71. 
See, e.g. Zirnrnerman v. Cook County Sheriffs Dep't, 96 F.3d 1017 (7' Cir. 
1996)(employer not liable to plaintiff who complained of "personality conflict" with 
supervisor since absent "an Orwellian program of continuous surveillance, not yet required 
by law," the plaintiff must provide enough information to make a reasonable employer think 
there was a possibility of sexual harassment); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 
88 1, 901 (1st Cir. 1988); Bouton v. BMW of North America, Inc., 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 
1994); Waltmanv. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468 (Sh Cir. 1989); Juarez v. Ameritech 
Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 3 17 (Th Cir. 1992); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 
995 F.2d 559 (8" Cir. 1992); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 ( 9 ~  Cir. 1991). 
83 Kaufinanv. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (6bCir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 831 (1992). 
84 E.g.Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994)(actions of a 
"supervisor at a sufficiently high level in the hierarchy would necessarily be imputed to the 
company"). 
real or apparent, to facilitate the haras~ment.~' This negligence theory of employer 
liability continues to govern cases alleging harassment by co-workers and  customer^.^^ 
Vicarious Employer Liability and the EllerthLFaragher Affirmative 
Defense 
A different set of liability principles was adopted by the Supreme Court for 
supervisory harassment in Ellerth (supra) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton." 
While working as a lifeguard for the Parks and Recreation Department of the City of 
Boca Raton, Faragher and a female colleague were subjected to offensive touching, 
comments, and gestures from two supervisors. Neither lifeguard complained to 
department management at the time of their employment or when they resigned. In 
addition, lifeguards had almost no contact with City officials because they were 
employed at locations far removed from City Hall. However, after resigning from their 
positions for reasons unrelated to the alleged harassment, Faragher sued the City under 
Title VII. 
Applying agency principles, the district court held the city directly liable based on 
the supervisory authority of the harassing employees and overall workplace structure, 
and indirectly liable because the harassment alleged was severe and pervasive enough 
to support an inference of knowledge, or constructive knowledge by the City. The 
Eleventh Circuit en banc rejected both theories and reversed. "An employer will rarely 
be directly liable for hostile environment harassment," the appeals court observed, 
because ongoing physical and verbal harassment falls outside the scope of the 
supervisor's employment and is unaided by the agency relationship. Nor was the court 
persuaded that city officials h e w ,  or should have known, of the harassment. 
As in Ellerth, the Faragher Supreme Court largely abandoned the legal 
distinction between quidpro quo and hostile environment harassment, looking instead 
to agency principles as guides to employer liability for supervisory misconduct. 
Justice Souter's majority opinion reiterated Ellerth's determination that sexual 
harassment by a supervisor is not within the scope of employment. But because a 
supervisor is "aided" in his actions by the agency relationship, a more stringent 
vicarious liability standard was warranted than pertains to similar misconduct by mere 
co-workers, where the employer is liable for negligence only if he fails to abate 
conditions of which he " h e w  or should have known." "When a person with 
See e.g. Torres v. Pisano 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997)(university not liable for hostile 
environment where plaintiff complained to university official but told him to "keep it 
confidential."); Baker v. Weyerhauser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (1 Oth Cir. 1990): Steele v. Offshore 
~hi~buildin~,~Inc. ,  867 ~.2d-1311 (1 1" ~ i r .  1989); ~wentekv. USAir, I&:, 830 F.2d 552 (4" 
Cir. 1987). 
86 See, e.g., Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361 (1 l'h Cir. 1999)(employer not 
liable for co-worker harassment where plaintiff never directly discussed matter with 
supervisor); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (lo" Cir. 1998)("an employer may 
be held liable for the harassing conduct of its customersnonly on the basis of negligence, i.e. 
if it "fails to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which management- 
level employee's knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known."). 
524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
supervisory authority discriminates in the terms and conditions of subordinates' 
employment, his actions necessarily draw upon his superior position over the people 
who report to him, or those under them, whereas an employee generally cannot check 
a supervisor's abusive conduct the same way that she might deal with abuse from a co- 
worker." 
The Court also determined, however, that public policy considerations were 
important in crafting employer liability rules. The congressional design behind Title 
VII favored both the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance 
mechanisms by employers, and a coordinate duty on the part of employees to avoid or 
mitigate harm. To accommodate these Title VII policies and agency principles of 
employers' vicarious liability, the Court in Ellerth and Faragher adopted a composite 
standard which for the first time explicitly allows employers an affirmative defense to 
liability for environmental harassment caused by supervisory misconduct. According 
to the seven Justice majorities in both cases: 
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an 
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or 
successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment 
action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability 
or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . . . The defense 
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care 
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the 
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 
While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with 
complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need 
for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be 
addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while 
proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable 
care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any 
complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will 
normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the 
defense. 
The affirmative defense is unavailable, however, and employers are strictly liable for 
harassment of subordinate employees by their supervisors perpetrated by means of a 
"tangible employment action," such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable 
reassignment. 
The affirmative defense adopted by the Court in Ellerth and Faragher imposes 
a duty of care on both the employer and the employees to prevent workplace 
harassment and to mitigate it effects. The first line of defense for the employer is to 
adopt and communicate to its staff and management an effective sexual harassment 
policy and complaint procedure. In most cases, the failure to do so - at least in the 
case of large employers, like the city government in Faragher - will result in strict 
liability for any harassing conduct by supervisory employees, whether or not the 
alleged victim suffers any adverse employment action. Questions remain, however, 
as to scope of that legal obligation, particularly in relation to smaller employers, since 
the Court's formulation appears to leave open the possibility that corrective actions 
short of a formalized anti-harassment policy may be reasonable, at least in some 
circumstances. Thus, considerations of employer size and resources, and the structure 
of the workplace - e.g., whether a single location or on scattered sites - may be 
relevant factors. 
Similarly, the latest High Court decisions place the burden on aggrieved 
employees to avail themselves of corrective procedures provided by the 
employer-thereby mitigating damages caused by the alleged harassment - or risk 
having their claim legally barred. However, whether an employee's failure to take such 
saving action would be deemed "unreasonable" if the complainant is able to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the employer's grievance procedure, that employees 
had suffered retaliation for invoking the procedure in the past, or that harassing 
supervisors previously had not been disciplined for their action, is not addressed by the 
Court. Nor do the decisions specifically address the fate of employers denied the 
benefit of the affirmative defense because an employee followed the complaint 
procedure set forth in the employer's anti-harassment policy. Is strict employer 
liability the rule in such cases, or is the issue to be decided in light of the overall 
appropriateness of the employer's remedial response? Thus, many questions remain 
for lower courts to decide in regard to the employer's assertion of an affirmative 
defense. Consequently, while clarifying the law to some extent, it may take the courts 
years to flesh out the concept of "reasonable care," "correct promptly," "unreasonably 
failed," and "tangible employment action," all key elements in the Court's definition 
of the employer's affirmative defense. 
Judicial Developments After Ellerth and Faragher 
Some guidance may be gleaned from later federal appeals court decisions that 
have grappled with issues left unresolved by Ellerth and Faragher. Much judicial 
attention has focused on whether conduct alleged by the plaintiff amounts to a tangible 
employment action, nullifying the employer's affirmative defense, and to the adequacy 
of any corrective action taken by the employer in response to alleged harassment. 
Aside from hiring, discharge, promotion or demotion, and benefits decisions having 
direct economic consequences, an employment action may be "tangible" if it results in 
a significant change in employment status. In Durham Life Ins. Co v. Evans,88 a 
tangible employment action was found when the employer took away the plaintiff's 
private office and secretary, denied her of files and control of funds provided by clients 
in order to pay premiums, and assigned her a large number of lapsed accounts. The 
Third Circuit reasoned, "[ilf an employer's act substantially decreased an employee's 
earning potential and caused significant disruption in his or her working conditions, a 
tangible adverse employment action may be found." Reinhold v. Commonwealth of 
V i r g i n i ~ , ~ ~  on the other hand, found no such action where the harassing supervisor 
"dramatically increased" the plaintiffs workload, denied her the opportunity to attend 
aprofessional conference, and generally gave her undesirable assignments. The Fourth 
Circuit ruled against the plaintiff because she had not "experienced a change in her 
employment status akin to a demotion or a reassignment entailing significantly different 
166 F.3d 139, 153 (3d Cir. 1999). 
151 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998). 
job responsibilitie~."~~ Similarly, in Watts v. Kroger Co. ," the affirmative defense 
was permitted to an employer who had altered the plaintiffs work schedule - such 
that she was required to give up her second job which had previously been 
accommodated - one week after complaining of sexual harassment by her supervisor. 
According to the Fifth Circuit: "Simply changing one's work schedule is not a change 
in [plaintiffs] employment status. Neither is expanding the duties of one's job as a 
member of the produce department to include mopping the floor, cleaning the chrome 
in the produce department, and requiring her to check with her supervisor before 
taking breaks." And an employee alleging sexual harassment who ultimately quit her 
job could point to no "tangible" detriment where there was no showing of change in 
salary, benefits, duties, or prestige, but only "rude and uncivil behavior" by the 
employer.92 But where a significant change of status resulted in the plaintiff being 
given a new, less prestigious position - amounting, in effect, to a demotion - a tangible 
employment action was found by another Fifth Circuit 
The first prong of the affirmative defense requires the employer to show that it 
took reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct harassment. Most courts have 
read Ellerth to require, at a minimum, that the employer establish, disseminate, and 
enforce an anti-harassment policy and complaint procedure. Thus, in Durham Life Ins. 
Co., the defendant was denied the Ellerth affirmative defense because plaintiff "was 
never given any literature or provided any information about the procedure to report 
sexual harassment and had no idea where such information could be ~b ta ined . "~~  The 
court held that the employer's policy must be disseminated to all employees and 
provide an assurance that the harassing supervisor can be bypassed in registering a 
complaint. The defendant's complaint system in Wilson v. Tulsa Junior Collegeg5 was 
found to be inadequate because it did not contain a provision for complaints to be filed 
after normal office hours. Plaintiff was a custodian and the harassment occurred 
during the evening shift. As a result, the employer was not entitled to the affirmative 
defense. And if the plaintiffs failure to invoke the employer's formal complaint 
procedures is not "unreasonable," the employee may still prevail. In Sharp v. City of 
Houston, the employee presented evidence that lodging a complaint was forbidden the 
"code of silence" which operated within the police department where she worked. 
Anyone using the reporting procedure would "suffer such a pattern of social ostracism 
and professional disapprobation that he or she would likely sacrifice a career in [the 
department]."96 She also demonstrated that procedures for bypassing the harassing 
supervisors were ineffective. Judgment against the city was affmed.  
"Id. at 175. 
170 F.3d 505,5 10 (Sh Cir. 1999). 
92 Webb v. Carcliothoracic Surgery Associates, 139 F.3d 532 (5" Cir. 1998). 
93 Sharp v. City ofHouston, 164 F.3d 923 (5' Cir. 1999)@laintiff s transfer from prestigious 
Mounted Patrol to less prestigious Police Academy, although voluntary, was compelled by 
sexual harassment and retaliation and supported judgment against city). 
94 Supra n. 87, at p. 162. 
95 164 F.3d 534 (1 Oth Cir. 1998) 
" 164 F.3d at 93 1-32. 
Beyond adopting an anti-harassment policy and procedures for its employees, the 
employer must undertake immediate and appropriate corrective action - including 
discipline proportionate to the seriousness of the offense - when it learns of a 
violation.97 Whether the employer has responded in a prompt and reasonable manner 
depends on all the underlying facts and circumstances, and the harassment victim's 
own conduct may be a relevant factor. Thus, in Coates v. Sundor Brands, I ~ C . , ~ ~  the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the employer's reaction to a complaint was adequate, even 
though delayed for a period of twenty months, because the employee's initial 
allegations were not suficiently specific to warrant an earlier response by the 
employer. The plaintiff originally requested that no work assignment be changed, 
forcing her continued regular contact with the harasser, and repeatedly assured the 
human resources manager that the circumstances were fine. The employer took 
immediate action to suspend the harasser when the plaintiff was finally candid about 
her problems.99 In some cases, alleged harassers who were discharged but later 
exonerated have sued their employers. The employer has usually prevailed, however, 
as long as the decision to fire or otherwise discipline the suspected perpetrator was 
based on a good kith belief of misconduct after an adequate investigation was 
performed. "The real issue is whether the employer reasonably believed the 
employee's allegation [of harassment] and acted on it in good faith, or to the contrary, 
the employer did not actually believe the co-employee's allegation but instead used it 
as a pretext for an otherwise discriminatory dismissal."100 
Even before the High Court's latest decisions, lower court rulings suggested that 
the most effective defensive strategy for employers to avoid liability for a hostile work 
environment was a proactive approach. Thus, in McKen.de v. Illinois Department of 
  ran sport at ion,'^' the "prompt and remedial action" taken by the state employer in 
barring hrther workplace contacts between the allegedly harassing co-worker and the 
complainant was held to prevent recovery on a hostile environment claim In addition, 
97 See Skidrnore v. Precision Printing and Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606 (Sh Cir. 
1999)(employer not liable because it took "prompt remedial action" when it instructed alleged 
harasser to leave plaintiff alone and moved her to a new shlfi even though no investigation was 
conducted until complaint was filed with EEOC six months later); Mockler v. Multnomah 
County, 140 F.3d 808 813 (9th Cir. 1998). 
164 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 1999). 
99 See also Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258 (5" Cir. 1999)(employer not 
liable for a vice president's sexual harassment when it took prompt and effective action upon 
learning of the situation); Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708,7 15 (2d Cir. 
1996)(employer's response prompt where it began investigation on the day that complaint was 
made, conducted interviews within two days, and fired harasser within ten days); Steiner v. 
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9" Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 US. 1082 
(1 995)(employer's response to complaints inadequate despite eventual discharge of harasser 
where it did not seriously investigate or strongly reprimand supervisor until after plaintiff filed 
charge with state FEP agency). 
Waggoner v. City of Garland Tex., 987 F.2d 1 160,1165 (5& Cir. 1993). See also Cotran 
v. Rollins Hudig Hall International, Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 93 (1998); Morrow v. Wal-MartStores, 
Inc., 152 F.3d 559 (7" Cir. 1998). 
lo' 92 F.3d 473 (Th Cir. 1996). 
the courts have generally been reluctant to impose Title VII liability on employers who 
act b'prophylactically" to stem harassing conditions before they begin. This is 
illustrated by Gary v. Longio2 where the D.C. Circuit dismissed a hostile environment 
lawsuit against the Washington Metropolitan AreaTransit Authority (WMATA) as the 
result of repeated verbal and physical harassment, and eventual rape, of a female 
employee by a supervisor. Claims of quid pro quo harassment were rejected due to 
lack of economic detriment. Moreover, WMATA escaped liability on the hostile 
environment claim because it had an "active and firm" policy against the sexual 
harassment which it publicized through staff notices, seminars, and EEO counselors, 
and because it maintained detailed grievance procedures for reporting acts of 
discrimination. 
The practical lesson for employers is to formulate and communicate to employees 
a specific policy forbidding workplace harassment; to establish procedures for 
reporting incidents of harassment that bypass the immediate supervisor of the victim 
if he or she is the alleged harasser; to immediately investigate all alleged incidents and 
order prompt corrective action (including make-whole relief for the victim) when 
warranted; and to appropriately discipline the harasser. 
Personal Liability of Harassing Supervisors and Co-workers 
Some division of judicial opinion persists, again because "agent[s]" are included 
within the Title VII definition of "employer," as to the personal liability of individual 
supervisors and co-workers for hostile environment harassment or other discriminatory 
conduct. A majority of federal circuit courts to address the question-the Second,lo3 
Fifth,i04 Se~enth ,"~  Ninth,lo6 Tenth1'' and Eleventhlo8 and District of 
C~lwnbia'~~-have interpreted agents in the statutory definition as merely 
incorporating respondeat superior and refused to impose personal liability on agents. 
These courts also note the incongruity of imposing personal liability on individuals 
while capping compensatory and punitive damages based on employer size, as the 
statute does, and exempting small businesses that employ less than 15 persons from 
Title VII altogether. Of the Courts of Appeals, only the Fourth Circuiti'' has extended 
Title VII liability to supervisors in both their personal capacity where the supervisor 
lo' 59 F. 3d 1391 (D.C. Cir 1995). See also, Farley v. American Cast Iron Pipe Company, 
115 F.3d 1548 (1 lth Cir. 1997). 
Io3 Tornka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995). 
lo4 Grant v. Loan Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5' Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S .  Ct. 574 (1994). 
lo' EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7" Cir. 1995). 
lo6 Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 99 1 F.2d 583 (9" Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 1 14 S. Ct. 1049 
(1994). 
lo' Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 989 (10" Cir. 1996). 
lo' Busby v. City of Orlando, 93 1 F.2d 764 (1 lth Cir. 1991). 
log Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert, denied, 116 S.Ct. 569 (1995). 
' lo  See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4" Cir. 1989), rev'd in part, afYd in relevant 
part, 900 F.2d 27 (4" Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
exercised significant control over the plaintiffs hiring, firing, or conditions of 
employment. The First Circuit, the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, and the Eight 
Circuit have yet to decide the issue, leading to contradictory results among the district 
courts in those jurisdictions. ' I  
Sexual Harassment in the Schools 
Issues surrounding the legal responsibility of school districts or other educational 
authorities for sexual harassment within the schools are highlighted by recent media 
reports of harassment of students by teachers and of disciplinary proceedings against 
students for alleged sexual abuse or unwanted displays of affection directed at their 
peers. Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments provides that "[no] person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial as~istance."~'~ Under the statute, student victims 
of any form of sex discrimination, including sexual harassment, may file a written 
complaint with the Office of Civil Rights (OCR)'13 for administrative determination and 
possible imposition of sanctions-including termination of federal funding-upon the 
offending educational institution. In addition, school personnel who harass students 
may be sued individually for monetary damages and other civil remedies under 42 
U.S.C. 5 1983 prohibiting the deprivation of federally protected rights under "color of 
law." 
Title IX also provides student victims with an avenue ofjudicial relief. In Cannon 
v. University of Chicago, ' I 4  the Supreme Court ruled that an implied right of action 
exists under Title IX for student victims of sex discrimination who need not exhaust 
their administrative remedies before filing suit. However, the availability of monetary 
damages under Title IX remained uncertain until Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public 
S~hools . ' '~  In Franklin, a female high school student brought an action for damages 
under Title IX against her school district alleging that she had been subjected to sexual 
harassment and abuse by a teacher. The Supreme Court held that damages were 
available to the sexual harassment victim if she could prove that the school district had 
intentionally violated Title IX. After Franklin, Title IX had been held to prohibit both 
quid pro quo and hostile environment teacher-student harassment. There was less 
judicial consensus, however, regarding legal standards for holding an educational 
institution liable for a sexually hostile educational environment created by student or 
teacher misconduct. 
The appropriate standard for measuring a school district's liability for sexual 
abuse of a student by a teacher remained unsettled until the Supreme Court ruling in 
I" See Hernandez v. Wangen, 938 F. Supp. 1052 (D.P.R. 1996) and cases listed therein. 
20 U.S.C. 5 1681 (a). 
34 C.F.R. 5 100.7(d)(1)(1995). 
441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
'I5 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District. ' I 6  The federal courts of appeals 
and district courts had adopted a variety of standards, including strict liability;Il7 a 
"knew or should have known" negligence standard;"' a theory of intentional 
dis~rimination;"~ or imputed liability based on principles of agency law.I2O In a series 
of three rulings, the Fifth Circuit has rejected each of these approaches in favor of a 
more stringent standard requiring "actual knowledge" by responsible school officials.121 
On June 22,1998, in Gebser, the Supreme Court answered the question of what 
standard of liability to apply to school districts under Title IX where a teacher harasses 
a student without the knowledge of school administrators. Jane Doe, a thirteen year 
old student, had been sexually abused by a teacher, but there was no evidence that any 
school official was aware of the situation until after it ended. Instead of strict liability 
or theory ofconstructive notice, Doe relied on the familiar common law principle later 
applied by the Court in Ellerth and Faragher that an employer is vicariously liable for 
an employee's injurious actions, even ifcommitted outside the scope of employment, 
if the employee "was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency 
relati~nship."'~~ According to this theory, the harasser's status as a teacher made his 
abuse possible by placing him in an authoritative position to take advantage of his 
adolescent student. Because teachers are almost always "aided" by the agency 
relationship, however, and application of the common law rule "would generate 
vicarious liability in virtually every case of teacher-student harassment," the Fifth 
Circuit rejected the approach in favor of its actual knowledge standard. 
In a 5 to 4 opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court affirmed, avoided 
any comparison to the strict liability and affirmative defense framework promulgated 
for Title VII employment law. It held that a student who has been sexually harassed 
by a teacher may not recover damages against the school district "unless an official of 
the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on 
the district's behalf has actual knowledge of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the 
teacher's misconduct." The differing legislative constructs of Title VII and Title IX, 
' 1 7  See Bolon v. Rolla Public Schools, 917 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D.Mo. 1996). 
'I8 Deborah 0 .  v. Lake Central School Corp. 61 F.3d 905 (7" Cir. 1995)(school liable if it 
"knew or should have known about the harassment and yet faded to take appropriate remedial 
action"). 
'19 RLR v. Prague Public School District I-103,838 F. Supp. 1526 (W.D.Okla. 1993)(school 
district not liable for sexual abuse by basketball coach because parents of student victim 
"failed to come forward with any facts showing the custom or policy, acquiescence in, 
conscious disregard of, or failure to investigate or cfiscipline on the part of the school 
district"). 
I2O Doe v. Claibome County, Tennessee, 103 F.3d 495 (6" Cir. 1996)(institution not liable 
unless teacher is aided in the harassment by an agency relationship with the institution). 
1 2 '  CanutiUo Independent School District v. Leija, 101 F3d 393 (5" Cir. 1996); Rosa H. v. 
San Elizario Independent School District, 106 F.3d 648 (5& Cir. 1997); Doe v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District, 106 F.3d 1223 (5" Cir. 1997). 
122 Id. at 1225 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency 8 2 1 9(2)(d)(l958). 
and an apparent reluctance to impose excessive financial liability on schools, appeared 
to drive the Court's decision. 
Unlike Title VII, Title IX has been judicially determined to provide only an 
"implied" private right of action and rather than a statute of general application, it 
imposes legal obligations only as a condition to the receipt of federal financial 
assistance. These distinctions persuaded the Court to "shape a sensible remedial 
scheme that best comports with the statute" and its legislative history. In analyzing 
congressional intent, the Court examined the statutory provisions for Title IX 
enforcement by means of federal agency termination of federal funds to noncomplying 
school districts following notice and opportunity to be heard. Given the express notice 
requirement of the statute, the majority felt it unfair to impose a vicarious or 
constructive notice standard on school districts in private lawsuits. Moreover, there 
was concern that the award of damages in any given case might unfairly exceed the 
amount of federal fbnding actually received by the school. Consequently, there was 
no actionable Title IX claim since responsible school administrators were without 
notice or "actual knowledge" of the alleged sexual relationship. The Court summarily 
noted that Lago Vista's failure to promulgate and publicize an anti-harassment policy 
and grievance procedure, as mandated by U.S. Department of Education regulations, 
established neither actual notice, deliberate indifference, or even discrimination under 
Title IX. 
The dissenters argued that the rationale for Title VII respondeat superior or 
vicarious liability - to induce the employer to take corrective action and limit 
damages - also applied to Title IX sexual harassment. Justice Stevens contended that 
the majority's rule creates the opposite incentive, encouraging schools to insulate 
themselves from knowledge, and predicted that few Title IX plaintiffs who have been 
sexually harassed will be able to recover damages under "this exceedingly high 
standard." In addition to urging vicarious liability, Justice Ginsburg proposed to 
permit schools, akin to the standard in Faragher, to assert internal procedures as an 
affirmative defense. 
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, decided in 1999, addressed the 
standard of liability that should be imposed on school districts to remedy student-on- 
student haras~ment."~ The plaintiff in Davis alleged that her fifth-grade daughter had 
Prior to Davis, the federal appeals courts were divided between those which refused to 
award Title IX damages or injunctive relief against a school district for student-on-student or 
"peer" sexual harassment, Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District, 80 F.3d 1006 (5' 
Cir.), cert. denied 519 U S .  861 (1996), Davis v. Monroe, 120 F.3d 1390 (I l'h Cir. 1997), 
and others, which had applied agency principles and Title VII legal standards to hold school 
officials liable for failure to take reasonable steps to prevent known hostile environment 
harassment by students or other thud parties. Murray v. New York Univ. College of 
Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248-50 (2d Cir. 1995)(dlscussing Title VII standards in analyzing 
Title IX sexual harassment claim); Brownv. Hot, Sexy and Safer Products, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 
540 (1st Cir. 1995)(applying ~ i l e  VII principles to Title IX hostile environment sexual 
harassment claim), cert. denied 51 6 US.  1 159 (1996); and ClydeK. v. Puyallup School Dist., 
35 F.3d 1396, 1402 (gth Cir. 1994)("school officials might reasonably be concerned about 
liability for failing to remedy peer sexual harassment that exposes female students to a hostile 
(continued.. . 
been harassed by another student over aprolongedperiod- a fact reported to teachers 
on several occasions -but that school officials had failed to take corrective action. 
Justice O'Connor, writing for a sharply divided court, determined that the plaintiff had 
stated a Title IX claim. Because the statute restricts the actions of federal grant 
recipients, however, and not the conduct of third parties, the Court again refused to 
impose vicarious liability on the school district. Instead, "a recipient of federal funds 
may be liable in damages under Title IX only for its own misconduct." School 
authorities' own "deliberate indifference" to student-on-student harassment could 
violate Title IX in certain cases. Thus, the Court held, where officials have "actual 
knowledge" of the harassment, where the "harasser is under the school's disciplinary 
authority," and where the harassment is so severe "that it can be said to deprive the 
victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school," 
the district may be held liable for damages under Title IX. 
In qualifying the Davis standard, the Court suggests that student harassment may 
be far more difficult to prove than sexual harassment in employment. Beyond requiring 
"actual knowledge," Justice O'Connor cautioned that "schools are unlike adult 
workplaces" and disciplinary decisions of school administrators are not to be "second 
guess[ed]" by lower courts unless "clearly unreasonable" under the circumstances. 
Additionally, the majority emphasized that "damages are not available for simple acts 
of teasing and name-calling among school children, even where these comment target 
differences in gender." In effect, Davis left to school administrators the task of 
drawing the line between innocent teasing and actionable sexual harassment - a 
difficult and legally perilous task at best. 
On March 13, 1997, before the Supreme Court ruling in Gebser, OCR issued a 
policy guidance addressing the institutional liability of school districts for harassment 
of students by teachers or other students. That policy states that a school district or 
other funded educational agency may be liable under Title IX if the institution knew, 
or should have known, that a student was being subjected to hostile environment 
sexual harassment by other students and fails to take appropriate corrective action. 
For quid pro quo harassment of a student by a teacher or other employee-involving, 
for example, use of grading authority to extort sexual favors-a district "will always 
be liable for even one instance" of abuse, regardless of its actual or constructive 
knowledge. Liability for a "hostile or abusive educational environment" attaches, 
according to OCR, if the harassing teacher or employee "reasonably" appeared to act 
on the school's behalf, i.e. with "apparent authority" or was "aided" in the harassment 
by reason of "position of authority" with the institution. A school district is also liable 
under the guidance if it fails to take immediate and appropriate steps to remedy known 
harassment.'" These standards appear to conflict with Gebser and Davis insofar as 
they would permit finding an institution liable for student harassment based on 
"constructive knowledge"- that is, what school administrators reasonably should have 




Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other 
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12039-40 (1997). 
Violence Against Women Act 
The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was enacted by Congress in 1994 
"to protect the civil rights of victims of gender-motivated violence." It imposed new 
criminal penalties for certain specified offences and created a private cause of action 
for civil damages against persons who perpetrate "crime[s] of violence motivated by 
gender."'25 Specific "crimes of violence" triggering statutory coverage include "State 
or Federal offenses" that would constitute "a felony against the person. . .or a felony 
against the property," as recognized by federal law,126 and which pose "a serious risk 
of physical injury to another," whether or not the misconduct alleged ever resulted in 
actual charges or a prior criminal action. To be actionable under VAWA, however, 
the complainant has to show that the offense was "motivated by gender," i.e., that the 
predicate crime was committed "because of gender or on the basis of gender,"'27 and 
was at least partially due to "an animus based on the victim's gender." 
According to the legislative history, "proof of 'gender motivation' under Title 111" 
of VAWA is to "proceed in the same ways proof of race or sex discrimination 
proceeds under other civil rights laws. Judges and juries will determine 'motivation' 
from the 'totality of the circumstances' surrounding the event."'28 In this regard, legal 
standards for proof of "hate crimes" may be "usefbl," such as "language used by the 
perpetrator; the severity of the attack (including mutilation); the lack of provocation; 
previous history of similar incidents; absence of any other apparent motive (battery 
without robbery, for example); common sense."'29 In other words, no cause of action 
will lie for injury resulting from mere "random" acts of violence, regardless of the 
gender of the victim, where it is not proven that the perpetrator was gender- 
motivated. 130 
The enforcement mechanism provided for this new right to be free of gender- 
motivated violent crime is a private civil action in federal (or state) court. The 
prevailing plaintiff in a judicial action may obtain compensatory and punitive damages, 
injunctive relief, and "such other relief as the court deems appropriate." While 
predicated upon conduct that is made criminal by other federal and state law 
provisions, the statute does not require a prior criminal complaint, prosecution, or 
conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action. No federal adrmnistrative 
12' 42 U.S.C. 5 13981. 
18 U.S.C. 5 16. In effect, the bill incorporates the existing federal criminal code definition 
of "crime of violence" as predicate for a civil rights violation under VAWA. 
127 Id. at 3 13981 (e)(l). 
12'S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 52 (1992). 
Iz9  Id. at 52 n. 61. 
130 Under evidentiary standards prescribed by fj 13 98 1 (e)(l), the complainant must prove 
gender motivation "by a preponderance of the evidence." 
scheme is authorized for VAWA enforcement.13' But parallel civil and criminal 
proceedings for conduct which constitutes a VAWA offense are not precluded. 
To some extent, VAWA overlapped and supplemented the protection of Title 
VII for women victimized by gender-motivated violence and harassment in the 
workplace. Title VII applies only to employment, but even there excludes a large 
segment of the national workforce employed by companies and firms with fewer than 
15 employees. A condition precedent to a Title VII judicial action is that the 
complaining employee or applicant first resort to the EEOC administrative process for 
voluntary negotiation and conciliation of the matter between the parties. Moreover, 
while the 1991 amendments added provisions for jury trials and compensatory and 
punitive damage awards in Title VII actions, such relief is limited by monetary "caps" 
that find no parallel in later law. The element of "violence," however, is not a requisite 
of the offense under either the Title VII or Title IX. 
The 1994 law's statement ofpurpose anchored the civil rights remedy for gender- 
motivated violence to the "affirmative" power of Congress under the Commerce 
Clause of the US .  Constitution and 5 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congressional 
power to prohibit or remedy equal protection or due process violations has historically 
been limited by judicial construction of the Fourteenth Amendment to "state action" 
or private conduct actively supported by the state or its agents. As discussed below, 
the power of Congress to regulate purely private conduct pursuant to its $5 power, 
alwaysproblematic, may now be a dead letter. Similarly, recent Supreme Court rulings 
have largely eviscerated congressional authority to regulate non-economic activities 
"affecting commerce" by application of civil or criminal sanctions. 
In United States v. Lopez,132 the Supreme Court invalidated, as exceeding 
Congress' commerce powers, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990133, which made 
a federal offense of possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school. As traditionally 
applied, the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate "use of the channels" and 
"instrumentalities" of interstate commerce, as well as activities within a state that 
"substantially affect" its flow. Despite the absence of congressional findings, the 
Government in Lopez claimed that the statute regulated an activity which substantially 
impacted interstate commerce because possession of firearms in a school zone may 
result in an increase in violent crime. Criminal violence, in turn, affects the national 
economy by increasing insurance costs, reducing the willingness of persons to travel 
to areas of the country perceived as unsafe, and by diminishing productivity due to 
impaired student learning environments. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that 
the regulated activity-firearm possession within a school zone-was beyond 
Congress' constitutional reach since it had "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort 
of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." The Court 
13'  This is in contrast to the voluntary negotiation and conciliation procedures of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission which must be pursued before filing a federal lawsuit 
seekmg relief from sexual harassment in the workplace under Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. $$ 2000e et seq. 
514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
'33 18 U.S.C. $ 922(a)(l)(A). 
rejected the Government's "cost of crime" argument as an overly expansive theory 
which would permit Congress to "regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities 
that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate 
commerce." Were this argument successful, the Court reasoned, "it is difficult to 
perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law 
enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign." 
The first criminal prosecution under VAWA involved a husband who was 
convicted of interstate domestic violence for severely beating his wife in their home 
and subsequently dnving her in and out of West Virginia for a period of five days 
before taking her to a hospital in Kentucky. On appeal, in United States v. Bailey,'34 
the defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds that the interstate domestic 
violence statute, 18 U.S.C. $2261(a), exceeded Congress' powers under Lopez since 
it concerned neither "channels" nor "instrumentalities" of commerce, and was not 
related in any "substantial" way to commercial activity. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, 
upholding both the VAWA provision and the conviction. Lopez was distinguished as 
not applicable to the domestic violence statute which required the crossing of a state 
line, "thus placing the transaction squarely in interstate commerce." Constitutional 
support for VAWA was drawn from earlier decisions approving the White Slave 
Traffic Act of 1910135 and the Mann A C ~ ' ~ ~  which condemned transportation in 
interstate commerce for various "immoral" purposes. In other words, the Lopez 
analysis was not relevant to the VAWA criminal provision, which incorporates an 
interstate component similar to these earlier statutes and "requires the commission of 
a crime of violence causing bodily injury, which certainly is not different from the 
immoral purpose forbade in Cleveland and the debauchery forbade in Caminetti." 
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in United States v. Wright13' 
sustained a VAWA provision malung it a federal crime to cross a state line with the 
intent to violate a state protective order and then to violate it.'38 A federal district 
court had voided the statute on the grounds that crossing state lines to violate a 
protective order was not a commercial activity and "does not substantially affect 
interstate commerce." The appeals court agreed that the "affecting commerce" test 
of Lopez was not germane but rejected the conclusion that crossing state lines for 
noncommercial purposes is not interstate commerce. Judicial rulings upholding a 
variety of federal offenses, from Mann Act to the crime of traveling in interstate 
commerce to avoid prosecution, had consistently a f fmed that "crossing state lines, 
without more, is interstate commerce." Also relevant was the fact that the statute 
required not only the crossing of a state line with prohibited intent, but that the 
perpetrator actually act on that intent. The defendant's Tenth Amendment challenge 
to the statute was also rejected. 
- - -- 
134 112 F.3d 758 (4h Cir. 1997). 
'35 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
Cleveland v. United States, 329 US. 14 (1946). 
13' 128 F.3d 1274 (1 997). 
13' 18 U.S.C. 5 2262(a)(l). 
Early judicial challenges to VAWA's civil remedy provision had also affirmed a 
relatively expansive interpretation of congressional power. In Doe v. Doe,I3' the 
plaintiffalleged a pattern of "systematic and continuous" physical and emotional abuse 
at the hands of her spouse over a seventeen year period resulting in severe emotional 
distress, trauma, and depression. The defendant spouse moved to dismiss, claiming that 
Congress lacked authority under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enact the VAWA remedy for gender-based violence. The federal 
district court rejected the motion, however, finding support for Congressy judgment 
that violence against women was a "national problem with substantial impact on 
interstate commerce." A "rational basis" for the legislation was found in "statistical, 
medical, and economic data before the Congress" that was lacking in Lopez. The 
Senate Report, for example, indicated that 50% of rape victims leave the work force 
involuntarily and that "fear of gender-based crimes restricts movement, reduces 
employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces consumer 
spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national economy."140 
Moreover, VAWA was found to "complement'' rather than encroach upon state 
procedures because it remedied "deficiencies" in existing state and federal legal 
protections against gender-based violence while preserving traditional state tort 
remedies. The federal safeguards were further justified, said the Doe Court, given the 
special harm, community unrest, and likelihood of retaliation, provoked by bias- 
inspired crime. 
The constitutionality of VAWA's civil damages remedy for gender-based 
violence141 had been sustained by eleven federal district courts when the Fourth Circuit 
en banc reversed an earlier panel decision and invalidated the statute.14' In U.S. v. 
  orris on,'^^ the Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court's conclusion that the civil 
remedy provision of VAWA exceeded Congress' constitutional authority. The case 
involved a civil action by a female Virginia Tech student against two male student 
athletes who verbally berated and raped her three times within minutes of their first 
meeting. Administrative proceedings against the perpetrators under the university's 
"Sexual Assault Policy" were dismissed or set-aside on two separate occasions, and 
the sexual violence had gone unpunished by state officials, when the female victim 
turned for relief to the federal courts. The district judge was convinced by the "totality 
of circumstances" - including vulgar statements made by the defendants concerning 
the assaults and the "gang rape" aspect of the case - that "gender animus" was the 
underlying motivation for the crime. But he voided the statute, since to equate the 
impact of gender-motivated crime with interstate commerce would "extend Congress' 
power. . . and unreasonably tip the balance away from the states." 
13' 929 F. Supp. 608 (D.Conn. 1996). 
I4O %Rep. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1 993). 
1 4 1  42 U.S.C. 3 13981(c). 
'42 Bmnkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 169 F.3d 820 (4' Cir. 1999)(en 
banc). 
That decision was reviewed initially by a three-judge appellate panel, which 
applied a "rational basis" standard in concluding that the "regulated activity" 
substantially affected interstate commerce. In contrast to the congressional silence in 
Lopez, the Brzonkala panel cited "voluminous findings" from the committee reports 
on the social and economic costs of gender-motivated crimes which warranted judicial 
deference and a "strong presumption of validity and constitutionality." In a an en 
banc rehearing, the full Fourth Circuit reversed, finding it "impossible to link such 
violence with a particular interstate market or with any specific obstruction of 
interstate commerce." Rather, the relationship between gender violence and commerce 
was too "attenuated" and indistinguishable from that existing "between any significant 
activity and interstate commerce." Invoking federalism concerns, the court declined 
to "rely[ ] on arguments that lack any principled limitations and [that] would, if 
accepted, convert the power to regulate interstate commerce into a general police 
power." 
These proceedings set the stage for the Supreme Court's long awaited decision 
on May 16, 2000 in U.S. v. Morrison, holding that Congress had overstepped its 
constitutional bounds when it passed the VAWA civil remedy. Declaring that "the 
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and which is truly 
local," a five- Justice majority led by the Chief Justice rejected each of the two sources 
of constitutional authority asserted by Congress to support the legislation. The law 
was neither a valid regulation of interstate commerce nor a proper means of enforcing 
the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. The commerce clause 
provided no basis for the Act, the Court said, despite the extensive record compiled 
and the findings enacted that the problem of violence against women had a substantial 
and deleterious effect on commerce. Just as the "noneconomic, criminal nature of the 
conduct at issue" was crucial to the demise of the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez, 
gender-motivated crimes of violence were, for the majority, "not in any sense of the 
phrase economic activity." Thus, congressional findings to the effect that gender-based 
violence deterred travel or employment of victims, diminished national productivity or 
added to national medical costs did not rationally support the legislation or require 
deference by the Court. In addition, the findings were "substantially weakened" by 
a "but-for causal chain," allowing "Congress to regulate any crime as long as the 
nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, 
production, transit, or consumption." Such reasoning was faulty under Lopez, the 
majority argued, because it would permit federal regulation of family law and other 
traditional areas of state concern, "completely obliterat[ing] the Constitution's 
distinction between national and local authority." 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment likewise provided no basis for the civil 
remedy provision because the constitutional guarantee of equal protection is directed 
at the states and its officials, not at private "individuals who have committed criminal 
acts motivated by gender bias," who are the sole targets of the statute. Since the 
VAWA civil remedy did nothing to the states or state officers, it was not a valid 
exercise of the 5 enforcement power. The Court also noted that the statute applies 
uniformly throughout the states, while the legislative record failed to demonstrate that 
gender-motivated crimes occur equally in all states, or even most states. Therefore, 
the VAWA remedy did not meet the judicial requirements of "congruence" and 
"proportionality" with the problem it seeks to address. The Court did not explain why 
Congress could not, if it decided the states were failing because ofprejudice or animus 
to protect women, provide a federal remedy against private individuals. 
Joining Chief Justice Rehnquist in the majority were Justices O'Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Souter dissented, along with Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, who charged that the majority with revision of the substantial 
effects test under the commerce clause by discounting its "cumulative effects and 
rational basis features." This "defect" in the majority's reasoning was its "rejection of 
the Founders' considered judgment that politics, not judicial review, should mediate 
between state and national interests as the strength and legislative jurisdiction of the 
National Government inevitably increased through the expected growth of the national 
economy." 
United States v. Lanier 
On March 3 1,1997, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated a ruling by the Sixth Circuit 
U.S. Court of Appeals which had reversed the conviction of David Lanier, a Tennessee 
Chancery Court judge, for willful deprivation of federal constitutional "rights, 
privileges, or immunities" under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4 242. The 
charges against Lanier stem fiom allegations that he raped, assaulted, or harassed eight 
women in his chambers who either worked for the judge, worked with him, or had 
cases pending before his court. The "right, privilege or immunity" allegedly violated 
was identified as a Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee of "bodily 
integritym-specifically, the right to be free of sexual assault by a state official. After 
a trial, Lanier was convicted on two felony and five misdemeanor counts of violating 
$242 and was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years in prison. A panel of the Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, but the full court 
overturned the decision and granted rehearing en 
Invoking established rules of construction for criminal statutes, and the Supreme 
Court ruling inscrews v. Uni tedSt~tes , '~~ the en banc majority set-aside the conviction 
on the grounds that existing 8 242 precedents failed to adequately notifl the public that 
simple or sexual assault crimes invaded a constitutional right or liberty protected by the 
statute. To avoid unconstitutional vagueness, a plurality of the Screws Court had 
construed the statute to require proof of "specific intent" to deprive the victim of a 
right "made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution. . .or by decisions 
interpreting them." The Federal Government had argued that a due process right to 
be free of unwarranted assault recognized by lower court decisions in other contexts 
provided adequate notice of criminal conduct to be punished. But due to the statute's 
"abstract" nature, and discrepancies among the circuits and federal district courts in 
their recognition of "new" constitutional rights, Chief Judge Merritt felt that "[olnly 
a Supreme Court decision with nationwide application can make specific a right that 
can result in $ 242 liability" and only when the right had been made to apply in "a 
factual situation fundamentally similar to the one at bar." The en banc court conceded 
the "outrageous" nature of Judge Lanier's conduct, but found that since the Supreme 
'44 43 F.3d 1033 (6th Cir. 1995). 
14' 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
Court had not so ruled in a "fundamentally similar" situation, the supposed right to be 
free of sexual assault could not form the basis for a federal prosecution. 
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Souter faulted the Sixth Circuit 
for applying too restrictive a standard and for concluding that $ 242 could never 
incorporate "newly-created constitutional rights." The "fair warning" requirement in 
Screws was not a "categorical rule" excluding from the universe of $242 safeguards 
any right not specifically identified by prior Supreme Court decisional law. To 
interpret the statute so restrictively, said the Court, was "unsound," contradicting both 
the legislative and judicial history of the criminal civil rights provisions and decisional 
law governing the corollary "clearly established" qualified immunity standard applied 
by the courts to determine civil liability of state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The 
"touchstone" for imposing $242 criminal liability is whether the statute, either standing 
alone or as construed by the courts at all levels, "made it reasonably clear at the 
relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal." According to Justice Souter, 
"general statements of the law" could provide "fair and clear warning" and may apply 
"with obvious clarity," in at least some situations, even though the particular conduct 
in question had not previously been held unlawful in precisely the same circumstances. 
The Supreme Court's disposition of Lanier avoided decision of the main 
substantive issue in the case-that is, the constitutional status of the right to be free 
from sexual harassment and abuse at the hands of state officials Other aspects of the 
ruling, however, and its contemporary legal background suggested the probable legal 
outcome of the case on remand. First, in a concluding footnote the Court rejected "as 
plainly without merit" several arguments-including the unavailability of 5 242 to 
enforce due process rights-made by Judge Lanier and relied upon by the Sixth Circuit 
to reach its earlier decision. This complicated the task of defending Judge Lanier's 
position on remand. In his background discussion of the case, Justice Souter also 
quotes with seeming approval from the trial judge's instruction to the jury that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protection of bodily integrity includes "the right to be free 
from certain sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery." This 
instruction appears to conform to the weight ofexisting lower federal court precedent, 
includmg a Sixth Circuit decision since ~ 5 a n i e r , ' ~ ~  making it difficult for the appeals 
court to reiterate its earlier finding that Judge Lanier did not have "fair warning" that 
his conduct violated constitutional rights.'47 In addition, Congress has enacted 
legislation based on the assumption that $ 242 punishes sexual assaults. '48 Finally, the 
146 Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495 (6" Cir. 1996). 
147 See, e.g. Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, 15 F.3d 443, 451 (5" Cir.), cert. 
denied, 1 15 S. Ct. 70 (1994)(teacher's sexual abuse of a student "deprived [the student] of 
a liberty interest recognized under the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth 
Amendment"); Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 
l99l)@laintiff s constitutional right were violated in a 8 1983 case when she was raped by 
a state welfare official); and Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 882 F.2d 720, 727 
(3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 US. 1044 (1990)("the constitutional right. . .to freedom 
from invasion of. . .personal security through sexual abuse, was well established" by the early 
1980's). 
14' In the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress required 
(continued.. .) 
U.S. Justice Department brief in Lanier noted that it prosecutes thirty cases per year 
under $ 242, many based on a due process right to bodily integrity. Since 198 1, the 
Civil Rights Division of DOJ had prosecuted at least twenty-nine $242 cases involving 
sexual assault by public officials, most involving a woman who was sexually assaulted 
by a jailor, police officer, or border patrol agent. However, three other cases besides 
Lanier involved sexual assault by state judges-two resulting in guilty pleas, the third 
in acquittal. 
In sum, Lanier questioned the fundamental nature of "constitutional crimes" 
prohibited by $ 242, a statute notable for its definitional vagueness and described by 
the court of appeals as "perhaps the most abstractly worded statute among the more 
than 700 crimes in the federal criminal code." Since the federal "rights, privileges, or 
immunities" whose official invasion may be the predicate for a $ 242 prosecution are 
not plainly spelled out by statute, its scope has traditionally been determined by the 
courts according to contemporary constitutional understanding of those terms. Justice 
Souter, in his opinion, appears largely unmoved by respondent's argument that to 
permit a $ 242 prosecution of Judge Lanier would encroach upon the traditional police 
powers of the state and impermissibly "federalize," by judicial decree, state offenses 
like rape and sexual assault into a federal "common law" of crime. Nonetheless, as 
noted earlier, solicitude for federalism and our dual system of government was a factor 
limiting Congress' commerce power to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez 
and could inform judicial review of the corollary issue posed by Lanier. To what 
extent, if any, such objections may influence renewed judicial consideration of the case 
can only be speculated. At this point, however, Lanier appears to expand the general 
availability of $ 242 as a safeguard against official deprivation of federal constitutional 
rights and, in addition, may constitutionally buttress the civil remedy for gender- 
motivated violence in VAWA, at least as applied to acts of violence by governmental 
agents or others acting under color of law. 
14' (...continued) 
enhanced punishment for several crimes in aggravated circumstances, including sexual 
violence. That enhancement provision applied to violations of 5 242. See P.L. 103-322 8 
320103(b)(3), 108 Stat. 2109. 
